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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----~-----~-~--~------~--~--------------~-----------------------
THOMAS C. MABEY and LOUISE S. 
MABEY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation,: 
Defendant and Appellant. 
-------------------------------------- : 
WASATCH CABINET COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 18338 
----------------------------------------------------------------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case at bar concerns those transactions involving 
the construction of a home by defendant and appellant herein, 
Kay Peterson Constructio·n Company, Inc., and the purchase of that 
home by plaintiffs and respondents herein, Thomas and Louise Mabey. 
Various subcontractors, suppliers and materialmen filed liens 
on unpaid accounts arising out of the home's construction. 
Plaintiffs, Thomas and Louise Mabey, filed suit against defendant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Kay ·Peterson Construction Company, Inc. for breach of contract 
for defendant's failure to satisfy the outstanding liens, and 
further for defendant's failure to complete the home in a 
quality workmanlike manner. Defendant counterclaimed alleging 
breach of contract and seeking reformation. 
Upon joint and unopposed motions the actions filed by 
lien claimants were consolidated with the action at bar. 
Plaintiffs compromised the lien claims, leaving present plaintiffs 
and defendant identifi.ed above as the only parties to the action. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried without a jury before the 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge in the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah. The Court 
rendered judgment for plaintiffs on plaintiffs' causes of action, 
awarding plaintiffs that amount paid to compromise the outstanding 
liens together with interest and attorney's fees, and awarding 
plaintiffs $5,400.00 as and for damages arising from defects in 
construction. The Court also rendered judgment for defendant 
in that amount prayed for by defendant based upon relief for a 
mutual mistake of fact. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek affirmation of the Court's Judgment 
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in favor of plaintiffs on their causes of action. Plaintiffs 
further seek reversal of the Court's Judgment in favor of 
defendant based upon an alleged mutual mistake of fact, or in 
the alternative that the Court's Order be affirmed in its 
entirety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The subject transactions arose in respect to theo 
construction, sale and purchase of a home on Lot of the 
Indian Springs Subdivision located at 3604 South Canyon Estates 
Drive, Bountiful, in Davis County, State of Utah. Kay Peterson 
Construction Company began construction, following discussions 
regarding plans with Tom Mabey, a civil engineer, in the fall 
of 1979, and the home was nearly complete by late March 1980. 
Although Mr. Mabey and the firm he was previously 
employed with had been consulted by the defendant respecting 
prior residential construction, Mr. Mabey was more involved in 
this particular project than on prior occasions (T-40-42). 
Mr. Mabey was involved in the modification of floor plans; he 
performed various services and purchased materials for the home, 
such as insulation and plumbing; and both Mabeys had input 
into sundry aspects of finishing work, such as selection of 
paint colors and cabinet design. 
During the course of construction there were no clear 
-3-
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or defined contractual arrangements between the parties. 
Mr. Mabey testified that his understanding was that the 
defendant was building the home on speculation, that is, without 
a definite buyer and speculating that a buyer would be found 
after construction (T-36-38). Mr. Mabey also testified that 
he had affirmatively represented to the defendant that he was 
not committed and would not commit himself to the purchase of 
the home during·that time (T-26, 36). Mr. Mabey also testified 
that it was his understanding that if the Mabeys did not pur-
chase the home, they would be reimbursed for materials and 
services they had contributed to the home (T-25-26). On or 
about March 20, 1980 defendant did sign a written memorandum 
(Pl. Ex. 0) eviden~ing an agreement that if the Mabeys did not 
purchase the home, they would be reimbursed a certain sum of 
money they had contributed toward the purchase of materials for 
the home. 
That same memorandum, dated March 20, 1980, signed by 
the defendant and admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
0, also provided that if the Mabeys did purchase the home, said 
certain sum would be 11 applied toward the Mabeys' purchase of 
same said lot and dwelling unit (total estimated cost to date 
is $134,068.40). 11 Construction was, at that time, very near 
completion and the Mabeys made efforts to obtain financing 
such that they could purchase the home. Between the 20th and 
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25th day of March, 1980 there was some discussion and negotiation 
between these parties (Plaintiff's testimony T-26; Defendant's 
T-115, 116, 88) regarding the terms of the sale and purchase. 
On March 25, 1981 plaintiffs and defendant entered into 
a written contract, in form of a standard Earnest Money Receipt 
with hand vJritten and initialed modifications. This "Earnest 
Money Contract 11 specifically provided, inter alia, that in no 
event shall the "total cost exceed $109,000.00 unless agreed 
upon in writing by both buyer and seller" (Pl. Ex. C). The 
figure of $109,000.00 was arrived at from deducting the price of 
the Tot, $27,000.00, from the total estimated cost of $134,068.40, 
with an approximate $2,000.00 buffer for incidental expenses 
to final completion. The Earnest Money Contract specifically 
did not include conveyance or consideration for the lot upon 
which the home was constructed. 
The lot, upon which the home was built, was acquired 
by the Mabeys through separate transactions, through an 
individual, a Mr. Jerry James. The essence of such transactions 
was that pursuant to other dealings and transactions not relevant 
to the case at bar, Mr. James acquired the lot and conveyed 
same to the Mabeys. In all, Kay Peterson Construction did in 
fact recover the full cost of the lot, as testified to by 
Mr. Peterson (T-86, 116), some $27,000.00. 
After closing of the sale a number of .subcontractors 
-5-
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and materialmen filed liens against the home on unpaid accounts 
arising out of construction of the home. Mabeys then filed 
an action against defendant and subsequently cross-claimed in 
the action brought by the subcontractors and materialmen. The 
lien claims, the action by Mabeys and the counterclaim again~t 
Mabeys by defendant were consolidated. 
Subsequent to consolidation, the Mabeys obtained a 
loan from Zion's First National Bank in order to settle and 
compromise the claims of the lienholders, and in fact the Mabeys 
did compromise claims totalling approximately $13,464.00 fpr 
$9,738.70. To facilitate that compromise the Mabeys were 
required to obtain a loan at current interest rates. 
The matter was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
J. Duffy Palmer. The Court ruled that there had been a mutual 
mistake of fact and awarded defendant that amount originally 
demanded by defendant in counterclaim. The Court awarded 
judgment to the Mabeys for the amount expended by them to 
satisfy the unpaid lien claims, together with damages for the 
interest they paid on the loan in respect thereto and attorneys' 
fees. 
The Court further ruled that ~s respects plaintiffs' 
claims for defects and the failure to complete construction in 
a quality workmanlike manner, the plaintiffs were awarded 
$5,400.00 in damages unless the defendant were to go in and 
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correct the defects to the satisfaction of the Department of 
Contractors for the State of Utah within thirty (30) days. The 
defendant was effectively granted the option of repairing the 
work to the satisfaction of a non-interested third party, or 
paying the plaintiffs the sum of $5,400e00 in damages (T-132). 
Subsequent ta trial defendant made no effort to correct 
existing defects for a period well in excess of thirty .days. 
Defendant filed objections to proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and after hearing Court entered said findings 
and conclusions as submitted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PLAINTIFFS 
DAMAGES FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLETE 
CONSTRUCTION IN A QUALITY WORKMANLIKE MANNER. 
Mr. Mabey testified that he is a professional and 
licensed civil engineer. He testified further to experience 
in residential construction including prior projects involving 
the defendant (T-13-14), and experience in analysis of 
management cost evaluation (T-32). His direct involvement in 
the construction of this home is well documented in the record 
and testimony at trial, and his familiarity with the home is 
of course obvious as owner and occupant since completion. 
Mr. Mabey identified, by reference to a list set forth 
-7-
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on two exhibits (Pl~ Ex. Hand I), a number of deficiencies 
and defects he discovered in the home's construction. He 
further testified that he was familiar with hourly rates of 
individuals who would be qualified to repair the identified 
·defects, and that he had estimated total costs of repairing· 
said defects based upon hourly rates averaging $17.00 per hour, 
some $8.00 per hour less than the rate Mr. Mabey understood the 
defendant to charge (T-32-35). Mr. Mabey estimated that total 
cost of repair would be approximately $5,400.00. 
Defendant did not offer tnto evidence any rebuttal as 
to the nature ·or cause of the defects, nor as to cost of 
repairing same. Defendant's counsel did object to the qualifi-
cations of Mr. Mabey to testify on these issues and was 
overruled by the Court~ presumably on the basis of the 
credentials and experience already described (T-32-34). 
Defendant's counsel did cross-examine Mr. Mabey as to particu-
lar defects identified (T~68-72). 
The testimony of Mr. Mabey, given his credentials, 
prior experience and direct knowledge of this particular 
project, constituted competent evidence and established a 
reasonable basis to support the trial court's findings tn 
this matter. It has long been the policy of this Court to 
not disturb the findings of the trial court if there is a 
reasonable basis in evidence to support such findings, 
-A-
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Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, at 500 (Utah 1976). The 
testimony presented at trial satisfies the standards noted 
in the authorities cited by defendant (Appellant's Brief, 
25-29): Mr. Mabey's testimony did present evidence upon which 
the trial court could find, with reasonable certainty, both 
the basis for and amount of damages. 
The Utah Suoreme Court ha~ previously s_tated: 
Damages are not to be denied simply because 
they cannot be ascertained with exactness. 
If a reasonable basis of calculation is 
afforded, it is sufftcient although the 
result is only approximate. Security Develop-
ment Company v. Fedco, 23 Utah 2d 306, 
462 P.2d 706 (1969)9 
The evidence presented in the case at bar certainly falls within 
these parameters, and the trial court's findings are supported 
by said, unrebutted, testimony and evidence. 
The defendant further challenges the sufficiency of 
evidence on this issue in what is apparently an attack on the 
credibility of Mr. Mabey's testimony (see Appellant's Brief 
2 9 - 31 ) , ref e r r i n g to the '' s us p e ct an d u n cert a i n n a tu re o f the 
testimony presented concerning the amount of claimed damages. 
(App. Brief 29) and further asserting that "No evidence of any 
kind was presented to show the cause of the alleged defects 
or to connect or link them to the Defendant Kay Peterson 
Construction. 11 (App. Brief 31). On the contrary, Mr. Mabey, 
a professional and licensed civil engineer with credentials and 
-9-
II 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
experience noted above and with extensive personal knowledge of 
this project, testified that there were certain defects and 
deficiencies in the home's construction, and said testimony 
was in no way rebutted. Assessment of the credibility of his 
testimony is a matter entirely within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and certianly should not be disturbed upon 
appeal, especially where no rebuttal evidence was presented 
in the trial court. 
The defendant's final challenge to the trial court's 
findings regarding damages arising out of defects and deficiencies 
in construction, appears to be an assertion that the trtal 
court was unduly and improperly influenced by representations 
as to proceedings before the State Department of Contractors 
and documents presented in respect thereto (App. Brief 32-33). 
Defendant proffers that the trial court "believed the "Correction 
Report" (Pl. Ex. I) to be a prior adj udi ca ti on by the State 
Board of Contractors for the liability of the Defendant Kay 
Peterson Construction for repair of the items listed on the 
report • 11 (App. Brief 32), and further that "the lower 
court limited the scope of examination and sustained objections 
to testimony and evidence apparently in reliance on that belief." 
(App. Brief 32). 
The trial court's position in this regard could 
hardly be more misconstrued. The exchanges between the trial 
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court and counsel, and the rulings as regards testimony and 
evidence, referred to in Appellant's Brief pages 32 and 33, 
considered in context clearly indicate that the trial court's 
position was that the plaintiffs were precluded from 
proceeding on any defects other than those identified on 
palintiffs Exhibit I and that defendant's counsel was pre-
cluded from c~oss-examination regarding other alleged defects 
because such defects were not in issue, and that such 
examination was irrelevant and in the interest of time would 
not be allowed. The trial court's "belief" as respects the 
11 Correction Report", Plaintiffs' Exhibit I, is most clearly 
indicated in the trial court's ruling that said exhibit was 
admitted for 11 informational 11 purposes only and not as proof 
of the substance recited therein (T-73). 
In this regard, the trial court did not limit defendant's 
cross-examination of Mr. Mabey as respects defects identified 
on the "Correction Report"; nor did the trial court deny 
admission of evidence or testimony that would rebut the 
existence of said defects, as there was, indeed, no such 
testimony or evidence proffered. 
The testimony and evidence presented constituted 
competent evidence and establishes a reasonable basis to 
support the findings of the trial court as to damages arising 
from defects in construction, and said findings should be 
. - 11 -
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upheld upon review. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PLAINTIFF THE 
COST OF SATISFYING UNPAID LIENS AGAINST THE 
HOME AND COSTS INCLUDING INTEREST AND A 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE. 
The "Purchase Money Contract" specifically provided, in 
writing, for the recovery of costs and a~torney's fees in the 
event of a breach (Pl. Ex. C, 1. 47-48). The trial court 
found, upon competent and sufficient evidence·, that the defendant 
had breached the contract in two respects: failure to complete 
construction in a quality workmanlike fashion and the defendant's 
failure to satisfy obligations owing to subcontractors and 
materialmen. In respect-to the latter, the plaintiffs obtained 
a loan at current interest rates in order to compromise said 
claims, and thereby clear their title to the subject property, 
and in fact did settle claims in excess of $13,400.00 for the 
consideration of approximately $9,737.00. Defe~dant offered 
no testimony or evidence rebutting either allegation of breach 
of contract. 
De fen d an t , h owe v e r , o ff e rs a no v e 1 the o r y t o ch a 1 1 en g e 
the trial court's judgment granting recovery of the cost of 
satisfying the unpaid liens, including interest, and a 
reasonable attorney's fee (see App. Brief 20-25); arguing 
that defendant was entitled to reformation of the contract, 
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that consequently plaintiffs failed to tender the total price 
and therefore defendant's failure to satisfy subcontractors, 
suppliers and materialmen did not constitute a breach of the 
contract. Such analysis is fatally flawed in at least two 
respects. 
First, the trial court clearly determined that the 
defendant did breach the contract in the two respects noted 
above, and the record reflects that said findings were based 
on competent, substantial and sufficient evidence. On that 
basis, and pursuant to the specific terms of the written 
contract providing for recovery of cost and attorney's fees as 
against the breaching party, the court was acting properly 
and within its discretion in awarding plaintiffs such costs, 
i n c 1 u d i n g i n th·i s i n s t a n c e t h e h i g h e r i n t e re s t r a t e i n c u r re d i n 
clearing title, and attorney's fees as were reasonable. 
Secondly, as regards defendant's contentions pursuant 
to a reformed contract, as defendant would have it reformed, 
prayer for reformation invokes the trial court's equity 
jurisdiction and thus accords the trial court wide discretion in 
formulating a just and proper remedy. The trial court did not, 
pursuant to such equity jurisdiction, relieve th~ defendant of 
paying costs and attorney's fees arising out of defendant's 
failure to complete construction in a quality workmanlike fashion 
and defendant's failure to satisfy subcontractors and materialmen. 
-1 3-
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The policy of the Utah Supreme Cout, in equity cases, has been 
often and clearly stated, as in Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452 
(Utah 1975) where, at 454, it is stated that· 
.•. due to the advantaged position of the 
trial court we will review its findings and 
judgments with considerable indulgence, and 
will not disagree with and upset them unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates against 
them, or the court has mistaken or misapplied 
the law applicable thereto. 
In all, the trial court's award of costs and attorney's 
fees was proper and within its discretion, and should not be 
disturbed upon appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT TO 
DEFENDANT BASED UPON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT .. 
A. THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides 11 ln all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity~" 
has been strictly interpreted and applied in cases where 
reformation is sought by reason of mutual mistake. Neely v. 
Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979); and Battiston v. American 
Land And Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980). In Neeley~ supra, 
this Court stated: 
1 II 
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In the counterclaim, Kelsch did not set forth 
with particularity any attack upon the deeds 
based on mutual mistake. They only generally 
asserted their ownership. In his opening 
statement~ counsel for Kelsch did mention 
mistake, but did not ask for an amendment of 
the pleadings to properly put mistake before 
the trial court. Therefore, the trial court 
improperly heard parol evidence intended to 
modify the deeds and thus should have only 
examined the face of the deeds in resolvinq 
the dispute. Neeley v. Kelsch 600 P.2.d 989-
(Utah 1979). 
The court's analysis in Neeley, supra, is particularly 
applicable to the case at bar. Defendant herein did make 
a general claim for reformation in counterclaim (Defendant's 
Counterclaim, Second .Cause of Action, R-15), but nowhere 
alleged that there was a mutual mistake underlying the execution 
of the "Purchase Money Contract," and did not plead with 
particularity circumstances constituting any such mistake. 
Defendant's counsel did not even mention "mutual mistake" in 
opening statements and did not move to amend pleadings to aver 
mutual mistake. During the course of trial plaintiffs' counsel 
objected to testimony that would alter or contradict the terms 
of the written agreement (see T-89-93, T-54-55, and Tll5-116). 
Defendant's counsel did not, on occasion of said objections, 
proffer "mutual mistake" as justifying an exception to the parol 
evidence rule. 
At best, defendant offered evidence that might indicate 
-15-
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that defendant had made a mistake in preparing the project 1 s 
cost estimate, and that said estimate was the basis for 
negotiating the purchase price. Defendant did not offer clear 
and convincing evidence that such a unilateral mistake was 
made, and defendant's counsel did not formally proffer the 
"mutual mistake" theory for reformation unti 1 closing argument. 
Indeed, very near the end of the trial, plaintiffs• counsel 
objected to a line of questioning specifically on the ground 
that that line of questioning was directed toward adding to or 
contradicting the terms of the written agreement (T-115-116). 
Again, defendant's counsel did not proffer the mutual mistake 
exception to the Parol Evidence Rule, and plaintiffs' objection 
was sustained. 
In all, the issue of mutual mistake was not properly 
before the trial court, indeed it did not even appear to be 
before the court at all until defendant's closing argument, 
and therefore the trial court erred in awarding defendant 
judgment based upon the alleged mutual mistake of fact. 
B. THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO PROVE, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT THERE HAD BEEN 
A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
In cases where reformation of a written instrument is 
sought on the basis of a mutual mistake of fact, it is the firmly 
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established rule that the party alleging reformation based on 
mutual mistake has "the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that there was a mutual mistake of fact. 11 Hatch v. 
Bastian., 567 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977); Maytime Manor Inc. v. 
Stakermatic, Inc., 597 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979). In the case 
at bar the evidence presented at trial at best indicates, and 
not clearly or convincingly, that the defendant may have erred 
in preparing the project cost estimate and that negotiations for 
purchase price were based on that estimate. In the absence 
of a showing of fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party, 
and no such conduct is herein in any way indicated, Utah case 
law clearly states that "unilateral mistake is not a ground for 
reformation." Ingram v. Forres, 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977). 
The mistake here, if any, was defendant's and was not 
mutual; indeed, plaintiffs merely relied on the representations 
of defendant in'two distinct written instruments: First, the 
written agreement signed by defendant on March 20, 1980, indicating 
a- total cost, including lot, of $134,0-68.40 (Pl. Ex. D). Secondly, 
the "Purchase Money Contract 11 which on its face shows a total 
purc~ase price of $109~000.00 for the tmprovements excluding 
the lot (which was paid for, in the amount of $27,000.00, by 
separate transaction), with specific reference to ·a project 
cost estimate prepared by the defendant. 
-17-
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C. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVE, BY CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING EVIDENCE, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MISTAKE FOR WHICH THE 
REMEDY OF REFORMATION WOULD BE PROPER. 
The limited circumstances upon which a party may be 
entitled to the remedy of reformation on the ground of mistake 
are specifically cited by the Utah Court in Jensen v. Manila 
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 
P.2d 63 (Utah 1977), at 64, as follows: 
The power to obtain the reformation of a 
written instrument exists when it can be. 
satisfactorily proved (1) that the instrument, 
as made failed to conform to what both parties 
intended; or (2) that the claiming party was 
mistaken as to its actual content and the 
other party, knowing of this mistake, kept 
silent; or (3) that the claiming party was 
mistaken as to actual content because of 
fraudulent affirmative behavior. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the circumstances 
in subsection (3) above would apply to the action at bar. The 
case at bar clearly does not fall within subsection (2) above 
either, for there is no indication whatsoever, in the record or 
testimony at trial, that plaintiffs knew of the alleged mistake 
and kept silent; indeed, the plaintiffs could do no more than 
rely on the representations of defendant as to the costs defendant 
had incurred in construction of the home. 
Thus, in order for defendant to prevail on the claim for 
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reformation, it was necessary that the defendant establish, by 
clear and convincing evidence (See citations in Point III-B 
above), "that the instrument, as made failed to conform to what 
both parties intended." Jensen, supra (emphasis added). In 
th:i s. con t e x t , t h e U ta h Co u rt a 1 s o s ta t e d th e re i n th a t 11 We do n o t 
rewrite the contract, we merely allow the writing to be made to 
conform, to the contract as made. 11 Jensen, supra, at 65. 
The irony of defendant's claim on this issue is that 
defendant does not clearly set forth what it purports to have 
been the contract as intended; nowhere in the record or in the 
testimony of any witness at trial, is there support for the 
position that plaintiffs intended to enter a contract to purchase 
the home for $127,000.00, exlcuding the lot. Nowhere in the 
record or testimony at trial is there support for the proposition 
that plaintiffs would have purchased the home, or could have 
even found financing that was crucial to their being able to 
purchase the home, if the price of $127,000.00, excluding lot, 
had been demanded. In sum. there is no support in the record or 
testimony, for the proposition that the Mabeys, plaintiffs, 
intended to enter a contract for the purchase of the home except 
upon a the specific and wri;tten terms set forth in the "Purchase 
Money Contract, 11 where it set forth a purchase price based upon 
a total cost not to exceed $109,000.00. 
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That was the contract as written and signed by the 
parties on March 25, 1980, and the record and testimony does 
not show that plaintiffs intended to enter any other contract 
than that. Indeed, just five days prior the defendant signed 
another written agreement (Pl .. Ex. D) representing two very 
significant facts: First, recognition that plaintiffs were 
not committed to the purchase of the home at that time. 
Secondly, that the total cost of the home, including the lot 
which cost $27,000.00, was approximately $134,068.00. 
Not only has defendant failed to proffer clear and 
convincing evidence that the intended contract was any other 
than what the written "Purchase Money Contract 11 (Pl. Ex. C) 
specifie~, the evidence and testimony presented clearly 
preponderates against a finding that both parties intended a 
contract differing in terms from the written instrument. The 
weight of the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the 
proposition that the intended contract was identical to the 
written contract: a purchase price of $136~000.00 with the 
lot included, or $109,000.00 not including the lot. 
D. THERE WAS NO MISTAKE. 
The ultimate irony in defendant's prayer for reformation 
by way of conterclaim is that defendant asserts that the contract 
should be reformed to recite a purchase price of $127,000.00, 
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excluding the lot, when the record, and evidence and testimony 
presented at trial, clearly, unequivocally and convincingly 
establishes thatthe contract was a cost plus contract with a 
maximum ceiling. The defendant offered no evidence to show 
that the costs of contruction incurred in building the subject 
home exceeded $109,000.00 excluding the lot. At best, defendant 
offered the testimony of an employee, Mrs. Squires, as to the 
records that were utilized in compiling the project cost 
estimate that served as the basis for negotiating the ceiling 
purchase price (T-94-113) and that she did not account for the 
price of the lot when co~piling that estimate, and Mr. Kay 
Peterson testified that he mistakenly agreed to deduct the full 
$27,000.00 lot price from the total estimated cost of $136,000.00. 
It must be noted that Mrs. Squires was an employee for 
less than three months out of that period in excess of five 
months during which the home was constructed (T-95), and thus 
could not possibly have personal knowledge as to whether all 
the records she referred to in the file on the subject home 
represented actual costs incurred in building that home. Secondly, 
she testified that she did not personally record or complete 
the information noted in defendant's Exhibits 4 through 10 
(T-105)~ and thus she could have no personal knowledge of 
whether the information contained therein referred to actual 
costs incurred in the construction of the subject home. Finally, 
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neither Mrs. Squires nor Mr. Kay Peterson nor any one else 
testified that those draws, disbursements or invoices, whether 
in part or in whole, recorded actual costs incurred in con-
s t r u c t i n g th a t h om e p u r ch a s 'e d by th e p 1 a i n t i ff s . I n s h o rt , 
the testimony presented by the defendant indicates a sum of 
draws and disbursements against the proceeds of financing 
obtained for the purpose of constructing the subject home, but 
does not even purport to indicate, as there was no testimony 
presented on the matter, whether or what part of those draws 
and disbursements went toward the actual costs of constructing 
the subject home or some other project of the defendant. 
On cross-examination it was clearly brought out that 
the best Mrs. Squires would testify to wa$ that many of the 
draws and disbursements went directly to subcontractors, suppliers 
and materialmen (T-111-113); but she could not testify that the 
services or supplies, or what part of them, went into the subject 
home's construction, except as to two of defendant's twelve 
exhibits on this; she testified that she could say that "most 
of probably exhibit 11, 12 11 went into the house (T-109). 
To sum up this point, there is no showing in the record 
or in the evidence presented at trial, that the actual costs of 
constructing this home ever exceeded $109,000.00; indeed, there 
is no proof submitted as to what the actual costs were with any 
degree of certainty or specificity. Thus, there was no showing 
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that there was a mistake at all in the execution of the subject 
contract. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF REFORMATION IS AWARDED, DEFENDANT'S 
MAXIMUM RECOVERY IS LIMTED TO $11,037.47 OR 
LESS. 
The record, testimony and evidence at trial clearly 
and unequivocally establishes that the sale and purchase contract 
was a cost plus contract with a maximum ceiling. Plaintiffs and 
defendant only disagree, basically, as to what that 11 ceiling 11 
price was, not as to other terms. Plaintiffs urge that the 
figure specified in the written contract was the agreed upon and 
intended ceiling price ($109,000.00, excluding the lot); while 
defendant urges that the ceiling price should be reformed to be 
$127,000.00, excluding the lot. 
Granting, for the moment, reformation as demanded by 
defendant, while that may change the terms of the written contract 
it does not result in any ground upon which the defendant can be 
awarded any sum of money; the defendant nowhere has shown where 
th e 11 co s t p T u s" a mo u n t e x c e e d s $ 1 0 9 ,, 0 0 0 • 0 0 • Th a t i s , th e d e f e n d a n t 
never did present adequate or competent evidence to show that 
the actual costs incurred, plus the profit amount identified as 
$8,500.00, ever exceeded the sum of $109,000.00. (See discussion 
on this point, analyzing the facts and evidence presented at 
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trial, in Point III-C and D, above.) Thus, the defendant never 
did show entitlement to any sum more than that tendered by 
plaintiffs. 
Moreover, defendant~ counterclaim alleges that plaintiffs 
were credited with payments totalling $148,000.00, which included 
payment for the lot (See Defendant's Counterclaim, Paragraph 14, 
R-14), (the lot payment, in total, was $27 ,000.00; see T-86, 
testimony of Mr. Kay Peterson). No evidence or testimony was 
presented at trial, one way or the other, as to the total sum 
paid by plaintiffs, and thus the $148,000.00 figure must be assumed 
as against that party, the defendant, so alleging. Defendant 
also alleged by way of counterclaim that the total costs incurred 
in the construction of the home, including the lot, plus financing 
and interest costs, and including the $8,500.00 profit amount, 
totalled $159,037.47. Defendant certainly never introduced 
evidence tending to establish that "costs plus" were anywhere 
near that amount (See Point III-C and D, supra.), but that is 
also certainly the maximum amount defendant can now be heard to 
claim was incurred. 
The above figures lead to some curious conclusions. 
First, if the contract were reformed as defendant would have it, 
plaintiff~' obligations would total $127,000.00 plus $27,000.00 
for the lot, for a total of $154,000.00; crediting the plaintiffs' 
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the $148,000.00 averred to in defendant's pleadings, that would 
leave plaintiffs owing only $6,000.00 instead of the $11 ,037.47 
awarded. Even as against the entire $159,037.47 "cost plus" 
figure plead by defendant, but not supported by the evidence, 
crediting the plaintiffs the $148,000.00 averred to in defendant's 
pleadings leaves the plaintiffs owing at most $11,037.47, and 
then only if the contract is reformed to a "cost plus" contract 
with no maximum ceiling (which is clearly contrary to the written 
terms of the 11 Purchase Money Contract 11 ). 
Plaintiffs' counsel does not urge that the above figures 
present an accurate picture of the subject transactions. Indeed, 
plaintiffs' counsel urges that the most accurate picture of the 
subject transactions, including the intention of both parties, 
is speci fi cal ly set forth on the face of the "Purchase Money 
Contract" (Pl. Ex. C), which document is entirely consistent, 
noting the $2,000.00 buffer for incidental costs to final com-
pletion added by Mr. Mabey, with the total cost including lot 
figure cited in the March 20, 1980 agreement (See discussion 
toward conclusion of Point III-C above) signed by defendant. 
Plaintiffs' counsel does urge respectfully~ that if the 
Court determines that the defendant is entitled to reformation 
of the contract based upon mistake or any other ground, that 
defendant's recovery be limited to $6,000.00 the basis therefor 
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noted aboVe, or in the alternative, the $11 ,037.47 awarded by 
the trial court below. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs proceeded in the action at bar upon two 
causes of action arising out of defendant's failure to complete 
construction in a quality workmanlike fashion and defendant's 
failure to satisfy obligations owing to subcontractors and 
materialmen resulting in liens against the purchased home. At 
trial plaintiffs presented competent and sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's findings that plaintiffs were entit1ed 
to judgment on both causes of action, and sufficient to establish, 
with reasonable certa i·nty, the amount of damages incurred. Thus, 
the record and evidence presented at trial clearly support the 
Court's Judgments in favor of plaintiffs, and said Judgments should 
be upheld on review. 
Defendant proceeded by way of counterclaim seeking 
re f o rm a t i o n o f t h. e w r i t t e n 11 P u r c h as e M o n e y C o n t r a c t . 11 I t i s 
upon this issue that the record and transcript of trial are 
replete with confusion, vague generalities and inconsistencies. 
Defendant's counsel did not proffer the mutual mistake theory 
until closing argument; indeed, "mutual mistake 11 is not averred 
in the pleadings, was not mentioned in opening remarks and was 
not once raised as an issue against plaintiffs repeated objections 
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to testimony that tended toward altering or contradicting the 
terms of the written contract. The transcript of trial nowhere 
indicates that any testimony was received for the purpose of 
contradicting the terms of the written contract by reason of 
mutual mistake. Two separate written agreements, both signed 
by defendant, represent on their face that the total purchase 
price, including lot, would be approximately $136,000.00, and 
excluding the lot would be $109,000.00 (See Pl. Ex. C and D). 
Finally, defendant did not proffer competent evidence nor the 
testimony of any one with personal knowledge to establish just 
what the actual cost of construction was or that it ever exceeded 
$136,000.00 including the l~t. 
The defendant simply did not present sufficient evidence 
to give the trial court grounds to reform the written instrument, 
or even granting reformation,. to give the trial court grounds· 
for awarding defendant any sum.of money. Moreover, even granting 
the defendant the reformation as sought, altering the terms of 
the contract to $127,000.00 excluding the lot, comparing that 
against defendant's pleadings where it is alleged that plaintiff 
contributed a total of $148,000.00 toward the home, subtracting 
the $27,000.00 lot price, that only leaves a difference of 
$6,000.00, not $11 ,037.47 and not $18,000.00, owing to defendant 
on the contract as defendant would have it reformed. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that judgments in their 
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favor should be upheld; that the trial court 1 s finding of 
mutual mistake and judgment awarded based thereon be reversed, 
or in the alternative, that judgment for defendant thereon be 
reduced to $6,000.00 or affirmed at $11 ,037.470 
Respectfully submitted this 3' day of July, 1982. 
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